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short, there is no inconsistency in the teaching of the bish< 
abortion and their teaching on war. They hold, as the Chur 
always held and as the Church will continue to hold until the 
time, that there are universally binding principles of the natur 
evangelical law, and that these principles absolutely proscri 
choice to kill innocent human persons. 16 
Catholic teaching on the question of abortion - and on th 
tion of killing innocent people in war - is unmistakably clea 
teaching is presented to the faithful as certain and true, and t h 
ful have an obligation in conscience to give internal religious as 
this teaching. 17 The effort to set it aside and to claim that teac 
contradiction to it can be legitimately entertained by Cath 
spurious and deceitful. The dec~itfulness of this attempt, I be 
manifested by Maguire's choice, knowingly made, to conceal f" 
readers significant passages from the pastoral on war and pea' 
sages which he knew could not support and indeed were intri 
destructive of the thesis that he sought to establish in his article 
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Do children born with severe handicaps have a right to live, to 
receive the food and medical treatment necessary for them to live, as 
Would a child born without handicaps? Or should the parents of such 
children be given the private decision to choose whether the child 
should live or die, on the basis of their judgment of the quality of the 
child's life and of the degree of burden he or she will pose for their 
family or society? . . 
That is the issue at the heart of the great national debate now 
raging over the fate of handicapped children and over what role, if 
any, government and the law should have in protecting their lives. At 
stake in that debate is the continued viability of one of the most 
cherished principles in American jurisprudence: the equality of all 
persons before the law. Are persons with disabilities to be treated as 
· equal befort-! the law? 
This is not really a debate over the respective roles of the state and 
l>arents in making decisions about and for their children . That issue 
has been long settled, as is decidedly shown by the recently publicized 
cases involving court-ordered treatment for "normal" children over the 
religious objections of their parents.I Parents have traditionally been 
accorded great autonomy in making decisions for and about their 
off~pring, because it has been presumed that they act for the benefit 
of their children. But when that presumption is disproved by their 
COnduct - when they engage in child abuse or neglect - the state, in 
the_ exercise of its parens patriae power, has always had the authority 
to Intervene on behalf of the best interests of the child. Nor, despite 
all the rhetoric about "Big Brother" and " Baby Doe Squads," is this 
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authority the subject of controversy. It becomes so only whr it is 
exercised on behalf of a handicapped child. The issue for t l law, 
then, is whet her the child with a disability ought to be treat 1 the 
same as or differently from the child with no disability wl n his 
parents want to let him die and there is an effort to use the pc er of 
the state to let him live. 
This article will review the legal precedents and principles a t take, 
then consider in their light how the courts have dealt w1 1 the 
Bloomington, Indiana Infant Doe case, the Stony Brook, Ne¥. York 
Baby Jane Doe case, and the litigation surrounding the vario ::; ver-
sions of the federal " Baby Doe" regulation. 
The Legal Precedents and Principles 
All 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, An ·rican 
Samoa, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have child abu. ' and 
neglect statutes which provide for the protection of .a child wh does 
not receive needed medical care.2 
A review of cases makes it clear that these statutes are p1 1perly 
applied to secure emergency medical treatment and sustenance (food 
or water, whether given orally or ·through intravenous or nast·~astric 
tube) for children when parents, with or without the acquiesc< 1ce of 
physicians, refuse to provide it. 
In Custody of a Minor (No. 3), 3 the highest court of Massac11usetts 
held that parental failure to provide medical care to a chil'l with 
leukemia constituted neglect. The court specifically rejected the con· 
tention that parental rights could justify a decision to withho ld t reat-
ment necessary to save the life of the child: 
[W] here, as h ere , the child 's ve ry li fe is th reatened by a parental d ecision 
regarding m edical treatmen t .. . t he safeguarding of children from ~ buse 
cl early supersedes pare ntal pre rogatives . 4 
The common law right of parents to make decisions abo ut health 
care for their children is broad, but it is based on the presumption that 
parents will act in the child's best interest. The law's tradition al d efer-
ence to parental discretion in selecting health care alternatives for 
children stops if that choice is adverse to the child's interest s, espe-
cially the child's interest in continued life even with handicaps. As 
long as the parents make an . informed choice from professionallY 
accepted medical treatment alternatives, courts will be satisfied that 
the parents are acting in the best interests of the child and will not 
find parental neglect in such conduct. Just as in the more typical and 
egregious case of parental abuse or neglect, when a parent 's acts or 
omissions endanger the life or threaten severe damage to the health of 
the child, the court will intervene to protect the child. " The parent 
... may not depr~ve a child of lifesaving treatment, however well-
intentioned. Even when the parents' decision to decline n ecessarY 
treatment is based on constitutional grounds, such as religious beliefs, 
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it must yield to the State 's interests, as parens patriae, in protecting 
the health and welfare of the child. " 5 
The case of a child who may bleed to death because of the parents' 
refusal to authorize a blood transfusion presents the classic scenario in 
which this doctrine is uniformly invoked. 6 
. · · In re Cicero 7 is a New York case in which parents refused consent 
for lifesaving medical treatment. A baby was born with spina bifida, 
and the medical testimony indicated that immediate surgery was nec-
essary to safeguard the child 's life. When the parents refused to con-
sent to the surgery , the chief executive officer of the hospital peti-
tioned to be appointed guardian of the baby girl. He wished to be 
appointed for the sole purpose of operating on the baby 's spinal 
lesion. The court found that , because of the infant 's physical condi-
tion, she was in imminent danger unless the surgery was performed, 
and that the child 's welfare demanded judicial intervention. The sur-
gery was ordered over the parents' objections. 
In an unreported case which is similar to the widely publicized 
Bloomington, Indiana "Infant Doe" case, a boy was born in Maine 
with gross deformities which encompassed nearly the entire left side 
of his body. Brain damage was indicated. He also had a tracheal fistula 
and could not be fed by mouth. Surgery to repair the fistula , which 
was the only immediate threat to his life, could have been performed, 
but the parents refused to consent. Several physicians at the medical 
center, including the pediatric surgeon who had been scheduled to 
operate, filed a petition alleging neglect . The trial judge granted t he 
petition and ordered that the surgery be performed, stating in his 
order that at the moment of live birth there exists a human being 
entitled to the fullest protection of the law, and that the most basic 
right enjoyed by ev~ry human being is the right to life itself. s 
In In re Vasko,9 a New York court upheld the validity of a state 
statute which created a children 's court with jurisdiction over neg-
lected children, including in the definition of such children those 
Whose parents refused to provide lifesaving medical care . The trial 
court had properly exercised its discretion in ordering, despite parent s' 
objection, an eye removal operation when the medical diagnosis 
showed that the child suffered from glioma, a malignant growth on 
the ·eye, which probably would result in death if not corrected . 
This sampling of cases provides ample justification for seeking and 
&ecuring a court order to mandate lifesaving medical treatmentand 
~Ustenance for a handicapped child despite parental object ions . There 
~ also a strong basis in legal t heory for the conclusion that those 
lllvolved in the intentional denial of t reatment and sustenance are 
su.bject to prosecution for homicide or attempted homicide, as well as 
cruninal child neglect. 
Courts have uniformly held that a parent has the legal responsibility 
of furnishing his dependent child with adequate food and medical 
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care. 10 Lafave and Scott state that failure to provide one's ch iJ .vith 
necessities of life, assuming that the parent has the ability to r vide 
the care, is criminally culpable conduct: 
Intentional death may be effectively brought about by an omission t ct 
... if there is a duty to act. A special example is the duty o f a pa re . LO 
rescue his imperiled infant. So a parent who fails to call a doctor to a t .1d 
his sick child may be guilty of criminal homicide if the child should d 1 o r 
want of medical care. 11 
Similarly, Wharton, on Criminal Law, notes: 
It is said that for a parent having special charge of an infant child so 
culpably neglect it that death e nsues is . . . murder if there was an in tl· to 
inflict death. To constitute murder there must be .. . wilfulness in wi t h ! !d-
ing relief. 12 
The courts have consistently applied this standard to insta: ·es in 
which parents have failed either to feed or to provide lifesavin ~ aledi-
cal care to their children. A Michigan case, People v. Lynch, in lved 
a mother's murder conviction for deliberately withholding fo• ·l and 
medical treatment from a handicapped infant.13 Althou1 . the 
mother's conviction was reversed on procedural grounds, the Jynch 
court stated unequivocally that if evidence shows that a paren · delib-
erately withholds care from a child and if this results in the : hild 's 
death, then the "charge would be appropriately classified as murci ·r." 14 
Disabled Children Are 'Persons' 
Children born with disabilities are "persons" within the prot ection 
of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. "Like any infant, 
the deformed child is a person with a right to life -a right that is the 
basis of our social order and legal system,"15 Under the 14th Amend-
ment, "No state shall . .. deny to any person within its jurisd iction 
the equal protection of the laws." 16 A state court refusal to enter an 
order mandating lifesaving sustenance or treatment because the child 
had a disability would constitute a denial of equal protect ion on 
account of disability. If the court would order sustenance and t reat-
ment for a "normal" child, but allow it to be withheld from a child 
with a handicap, then this would constitute invidious discrimination 
on the basis of disability. . 
Since a good case can be made that the disabled are a "susp~ct 
class,"17 state action discriminating against them is subject to " str1ct 
scrutiny." 18 
Under strict scrutiny, discriminatory state action must be justified 
by a "compelling state interest" to be constitutional. Even if the 
handicapped are not a suspect class, discrimination against thelll 
would still require a legitimate state interest to be constitutional. 19 
The elimination of those with a purportedly low "quality of life." 
can qualify neither as a compelling nor as a legitimate interest in thiS 
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context. Even if there is a state interest in reducing the incidence of 
disabilities because of the possible "burdens" individuals with disabil-
ities impose on family members and society as a whole, it may not 
constitutionally be fostered by eliminating the victims of handi-
_capping conditions. No one would argue that, to advance an interest in 
reducing the incidence of sickle-cell anemia, the State might constitu-
tionally execute blacks who suffer from the disease, or that, to 
advance an interest in reducing poverty, the State might constitution-
ally completely withdraw police protection from poor people while 
answering all calls for police assistance from those with incomes above 
poverty level. 
These are arguments on behalf of the constitutional rights of the 
child to equal treatment. On the other hand, attorneys for the parents 
and doctors are likely to claim that their decision is protected by 
constitutional rights of physicians to practice medicine, by parental 
Privacy rights, and by the child's right to die. Such claims are 
unfounded. · 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that physicians may rely on no 
independent constitutional right: 
Nothing .. . suggests that a docto r's right to adminis t e r medical care h as any 
greater strength than his patient 's righ t t o receive such care .... If [statu-
tory] obstacles had not impacted upon [the pa t ie nt 's] fre edom to m ak e a 
constitutionally protected decision , if they had merely made the physic ian 's 
work more laborious or less independent without any impact on the patient, 
this would not have violate d the Constitution. 20 
Parents do have a right to familial privacy and to the care and 
custody of their children, but that right is not so broad that it gives 
them the freedom to bring about their children's deaths by deliberate 
liledical neglect. Parents may not rely on the Constitution to inflict 
serious harm on their children ~ Thus, in Prince v. Massachusetts, 21 . 
the Supreme Court held that parental rights could not overcome the 
government's interest in protecting children from burdensome and 
- exploitive work through the child labor laws. In Jehovah 's Witnesses v. 
K~ng County Hospital, 22 it summarily held that a parent could not 
-Withhold a blood transfusion needed to save a child's life. 
. It may be argued that_ the constitutional right of privacy protects an 
llldividual's right to · die in the sense of a right to refuse medical treat-
ment, at least in some circumstances. 23 Whatever application this view 
rnay have to a competent individual or to a once-competent individual 
~hose desires can be inferred from his or her views while competent, 
It has no application to an incompetent individual who has never ~n competent to make such decisions - such as a handicapped 
lllfant. 
The decision of the highest court of New York in In re Storar, 24 
!bakes the distinction clear. In Storar, the New York Court of 
Appeals was concerned with two individuals : Brother Fox, who had 
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been a competent man of normal intelligence and capacity i 
surgical complication led to his comatose incompetency, an c 
Storar, who was an instit utionalized and profoundly retarded 5_ 
old man who had never had a m ental age of more t han a b. 
months.25 Brother Fox 's religious superior sought judicial p em 
to disconnec t his respirator , while Storar 's mother sought to p 
the giving of lifesaving blood transfusions to her son. 
The Storar court drew a sharp distinction between the two c 
held that " clear and convincing evidence" proved that Broth ( 
while competent, had indicated his desire that treat m ent of tl· 
at issue should not be provided to him. On the basis of the c< 
law " right of a patient to control t he course of his medi ca 
ment," the court held that Brother Fox should be removed fr 
respirator. 26 With regard to John Storar, on the other hand , th 
declared that his treat ment should have been ordered: 
J ohn Storar ... was always t o ta ll y incapa ble of understa nding or m ak 
reasoned decision about m edi cal treatm ent. Thus it is unrealist ic to a U 
to determine whe ther he would wa n t to conti nue po te ntiall y life prol o 
treatment if he w ere compe te nt . As one o f t he ex p erts test ified " 
hearing, tha t would be similar to asking whether "if it snowed a ll Sll ' 
would it the n be winter?" 27 
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The Storar court held that in such circumstances " a cour t ould 
not ... allow an incompetent patient to bleed to death becau s· ·-;o rne-
one, even someone as close as a parent or a sibling, feels t h a: ·. h is is 
best .... "28 Similarly, to say that a parent could u se "su b:-- tt u ted 
judgment" to exercise a disabled infant's " right to die" would < n ount 
to the acceptance of involuntary euthanasia. 
Two recent cases have run counter to these general prin cJ.J les. In 
the Indiana case publicly known as " Infant Doe" (the reac Lio n to 
which ultimately resulted in the Jan. 12, 1984 regulatio ns of the 
Health and Human Services under Section 504 of the Reha b :li tation 
Act of 1973) and in the New York case known as " Baby J a n;· Doe," 
the parents were allowed to reject medical treatment for th e l·hildren 
involved, even though in the Indiana case it meant starva twn and 
death within six days and , in the New York case, life l imited to 
approximately two to four years with an unoperat ed lesio n o f the 
spinal cord. Why is this so? Is the law changing so that parents maY 
now determine t hat if the qual'ity of the child 's life with t rea t ment IS 
unacceptable to them they may reject treatment and allow the child 
to die? Have we reached the stage sought by Duff and Campbell in 
their famous 197 3 paper calling for such changes in the law? 
If work ing o ut t h ese dile mmas in ways such as t hose we su ggest is in viola-
tion of t he law , w e believe the la w should be chan ged . 2 9 
Can it fairly be said of the New York and Indiana cases tha t the laW 
now allows parents with severely handicapped children sole discretion 
in treatment choices for their child? 
Infant Doe 
On April 9 , 1982, Infant Doe was born at Bloomington Hospital at 
Bloomington, Indiana. He was born with a surgically correctable con-
dition known as tracheoesophageal fistula that prevented him from 
. ·orally ingesting food and water . However, he could have received 
fluids and nourishment through intravenous feeding. 
Although Bloomington Hospital was not adequately equipped to 
perform the surgery necessary to enable Infant Doe to eat normally, 
nearby Riley Children 's Hospital was equipped to handle t his kind of 
surgery a·nd employed an excellent pediatric surgeon. This lifesaving 
surgery, while difficult, has been performed since 1941 and has a 
probable success rate of bett er than 90% if performed within t he first 
24 hours of birth. 30 If the surgery and nourishment were withheld, 
Infant Doe would certainly die. 
Despite the favorable success rate for surgery and the certainty of 
death without it, the obstetrician who delivered Infant Doe offered 
Mr. and Mrs. Doe the alternative of doing nothing to save the life of 
their child. He offered this as an alternative course of " treatment" 
because Infant Doe, in addition to having a tracheoesophageal fistula, 
also had Down's syndrome. 
Feeling that a "minimally acceptable" quality of life could not be 
Obtained by an infant with Down's syndrome and that it would be in 
the best interests of the infant, their two other children at home, and 
their family entity as a whole if Infant Doe died, Mr. and Mrs. Doe 
decided that no corrective surgery should be performed and that no 
food or water should be administered. 3l 
On April 10, 1982, a hearing concerning Infant Doe was held at 
Bloomington Hospital before Judge John Baker of the Monroe Circuit 
Court. The hearing was held at the request of Bloomington Hospital, 
Which sought guidance from the court . 
Although no record of the April 10 hearing was made, Judge 
~er's declaratory judgment of April 12 indicates that the obstetri-
Cian testified at the hearing and recommended that Infant Doe be kept 
· at Bloomington Hospital and that he not be given lifesaving surgery, 
food, or water. 32 
In making his recommendation, the obstetrician relied on the fact 
that although surgery woulq correct the tracheoesophageal fistula and 
therefore allow the child to survive, it could not cure any mental 
retardation associated with Down 's syndrome. Accordingly, the 
obstetrician testified that even if corrective surgery were successful, 
Infant Doe could not attain a " minimally acceptable quality of life. " 33 
Three other physicians also testified. They all recommended that 
Infant Doe be transferred immediately to Riley Children 's Hospital for 
COrrective surgery. 34 
In a hearing held April 13 in a companion case, brought by the 
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Monroe County Prosecutor to secure treatment for Infant De 
testimony was "substantially the same" as in the April 10 hea r 
which no record exists. 35 In the April 13 hearing, in contrast 
obstetrician's testimony, a pediatrician testified that it was imp 
to determine the severity of mental retardation in a newborn 
with Down's syndrome. He also testified that there is a broad n : 
IQs for Down's syndrome children; they may range from St 
retarded children with IQs of 20 to 30, all the way into th e ' 
intelligence range. 36 The obstetrician did not dispute this test 
Indeed, he agreed with it, stating, "As [has been] indicated 
can be absolutely sure of the degree of retardation at the t 
birth. "37 Despite this, the obstetrician insisted that Infant Do1 
not attain a " minimally acceptable" quality of life : 
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Both [of the othe r phys icians J we re prepared to tell the pare n ts to ~ ive 
them only one option. To send the child to Ril ey Hospital for surgery . I 
insist ed upon giving the parents a choice. I felt that this was not an ade ate 
descr ip ti on of t he s ituation. I insisted upon telling the par·ents, pointi n o ut 
to the parents tha t if this surgery were performed and if it we re succ• sful 
and the child survived , that this still would not b e a normal child. T 1 1t it 
would st ill be a mongoloid , a Down 's sy ndrome child with all the p ro I ms 
that even th e b es t of the m have. That they did have another alternative ' 1ich 
was to do no thing. In which case th e child would proba bly live only a n tter 
of severa l da ys a nd would di e of pneumonia probably .. . . Some o f ese 
childre n , as I indicated in m y testimony to Judge Ba ker are m ere i o bs. 
Some of t h em , most of them , eve ntually lea rn to walk a nd most of em 
eventually lea rn to ta lk .... (T J hi s ta lk consists o f a si ngl e word or •· Jm~­
th ing of this sort at best. I have never personall y known the true Do wn s 
Syndrome child t hat was a bl e to be gai nfull y employed in anythin g ,)ther 
tha n a s h e ltered workshop , with constant supervision , in other w • ds, ,a 
c hild that c ould be self-suppor t ing. I've never h e ard of such a Do w n s 
Sy ndrome child. I 've never h eard of a Down 's Syndrom e child tha t c o uld 
li ve a lone . They require at best c onstant attention .. . . These ch ild re n are 
qui tf' inca p a bl e of telling us what t hey fee l, and what they se nse, an d so 
011 . 38 
On April 12, 1982, the court issued a declaratory judgment order-
ing Bloomington Hospital to allow Mr. and Mrs. Doe to cho ose _a 
course of "treatment" for Infant Doe that was certain to result in hiS 
death. 39 
Two orders were issued by trial courts in these cases. The first was 
the declaratory judgment issued April 12, 1982. The second was an 
order dismissing the companion case entered on April14, 1982. Both 
orders are included in their entirety in the Appendix following the 
references for this article. 
Baby Jane Doe 
·t 1 in On Oct. 11, 1!)83, Baby Jane Doe was born in a small hosp1 a f 
Port Jefferson , N.Y. -to She had spina bifida, involving the fai lure 0 
the spinal column to seal in the spinal cord completely , and hydro-
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cephalus, or excessive fluid surrounding her brain. The standard treat-
ment for this condition is surgery to close the spine and shunt the 
fluid from the brain. Although they received an initial recommenda-
tion for surgery and transferred her to the state university hospital at 
Stony Brook, Long Island, because it had the proper surgical facilities, 
.her parents, on the advice of Dr. George Newman, soon decided to 
deny consent for these measures. Someone inside the hospital con-
tacted attorney Lawrence Washburn, who applied to the New York 
Supreme Court (a low level court of general jurisdiction) for the 
appointment of a guardian ad litem to argue on behalf of surgery for 
the child.41 Justice Tannenbaum appointed William Weber to that 
post, and a hearing was held on Oct. 19 and 20, at the conclusion of 
which the court ordered the surgery to be performed. 42 The ruling 
was immediately appealed to the appellate division, which stayed the 
order and, after hearing arguments, on Oct . · 21 reversed t he lower 
court's ruling. In a narrowly drawn and fact-based opinion, the unani-
mous court affirmed the authority of the lower court to entertain the 
question, but reread the record as indicating that the parents simply 
chose one among two courses of risky medical treatment. 
[T J his is not a case where a n infant is being de pri ved of medi cal treatm ent 
to achieve a quick and supposedly m erci ful death . R ather, it IS a situation 
where the parents have chosen one course of appropriate medical treatm ent 
over another. 43 
Guardian ad litem Weber then appealed to the state's highest court, 
the Court of Appeals. In an opinion that can be described as caustic, 
the court dismissed the case, holding that the interveners on behalf of 
the child, whose actions it called "offensive," 44 had no standing to 
challenge the parents' private decision . Since New York's child protec-
tion agency concurred with the parents' decision , the high court essen-
tially ruled that intervention to save the child's life was impossible. 45 
_That ruling prompted the United States Justice Department to 
hnng suit in federal District Court on Nov. 17 to obtain Baby Jane's 
. medical records under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197 3, 
Which prohibits discrimination on the basis of handicap in federally ~ded hospitals. Long Island 's Stony Brook Hospital had refused to 
give government civil rights investigators the child's medical records 
subsequent to the OCt. 19-20 lower court hearings. The district court 
ruled against the Justice Department, and that ruling was affirmed by 
the Second Circuit of Appeals. 46 We shall return to these rulings after 
c_onsidering the litigation surrounding the federal " Baby Doe " regula-
tions. 
First, however it will be useful to examine more carefully the facts ~f the Baby Jan~ Doe case. The contrast between the pubhc percep-
tion of those facts, as a result of inaccuracies spread by press reports 
and by the courts themselves and the true condition of the child 
Provides a classic case study df the way in which dehumanizing fal-
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lacies about the disabled color our judgment and foster our pre: lice. 
In March of 1984, after winning on every level in their fi t to 
avoid surgery for their daughter, Baby Jane Doe's parents d 1ged 
their minds. They agreed to permit surgery to install a shunt f the 
hydrocephaly.47 Her spinal lesion, having healed (a rare, b1 not 
unprecedented, happenstance in the absence of spinal closure su 2ry ), 
she left the hospital for her parents' home on April 4 . At the t 1e of 
greatest public attention to her plight, amidst the flurry of litiga ·m in 
October and November, 1983, the universal public expectati1 was 
not nearly so rosy. 
Statements by Press 
Press reports, columns, editorials, and court opinions statec lmost 
without equivocation that Baby Jane Doe would be severely n 1rded, 
bedridden, and live only to age 20 if given the surgery. 48 'et an 
examination of the testimony at the lower court hearing led Jne of 
the nation's leading experts on the treatment of spina bifi •a, Dr. 
David MeLone, chief of pediatric neurosurgery at Chicago 's Cr' ldren 's 
Memorial Hospital and associate professor of surgery at North ·estern 
University Medical School, to conclude, " If you take our ex} ' rience 
of a child [in Baby Jane Doe 's described medical condition ] would 
predict that the child in our hands would have a normal intf' ligence 
and would be a community ambulator .. . [walking] probab:y with 
some bracing." 49 
Testifying at the lower court hearings, which are still t he onlY 
detailed source of information on the child's medical condit1on, Dr. 
Newman, a neurologist at Stony Brook Hospital , said that the child 's 
head at birth "was abnormally small," which gave her " virtually a 100 
percent chance of being retarded."50 But Dr. Albert Butler, chief of 
neurological surgery at the hospital , Newman's superior , and the onlY 
other physician to testify in the case, agreed with a statement that the 
baby's 31-centimeter head circumference was "within normal 
measurements for a baby of that size." 51 
Dr. MeLone, who has treated over 1 ,000 children with spina bifida, 
agrees with Butler: "Approximately 15 to 20 percent of t he childre~ 
born with spina bifida have a head circumference in that [ 31 cent!· 
meter] range, and that is perfectly compatible with normal iritellec· 
tual development." In fact, said MeLone, some children in that range 
of head size are among the "very brightest" of individuals with spina 
bifida. "It 's the child who has the extremely large head who is at risk 
for having decreased intellectual development. It's act ually back· 
wards," he said of the prognosis. 52 
Newman testified that the parents decided it would be unkind to 
allow the child to undergo surgery, because " [ o] n the basis of th.e 
combinations of the malformations that are present in this child she 15 
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not likely to ever achieve any meaningful interaction with her environ-
men~ •. nor ever to achieve any interpersonal relationships, the very 
quahties that we consider hurrian . . . . " 53 Newman also asserted " It's 
unlike~y that she is going to develop any cognitive skills, " 54 and that 
the child would have positive experience of " nothing whatsoever" on 
the cognitive scale. 55 But Dr. Butler asserted , " I think we have to 
reasonably expect that this. child might be able to sit up, look around , 
be aware of parents or good friends .. . . " ?6 Butler, who with New-
m~, ~avored the parents ' decision, also contradicted Newman by 
affrrmmg that the child would, at least to a limited extent be able to 
. ' expenenc~ emotions such as sadness and joy, if she lived long enough. 57 
. In cases similar to Baby Jane Doe 's, Dr. Butler stated in the Nov. 9 
~ue of Newsday , that it is possible that the child " with special educa-
tlo~ could be able to feed himself, talk some, have fun in a very 
rudimentary kindergarten-type class but not necessarily go home with 
much information. " 58 
The Arnold-Chiari brain malformation to which Dr. Newman's grim 
prognosis referred involves a compression of the brain stem. 59 This, as 
Well as a dilation of the brain 's ventricles, were measured by an ultra-
sound sonogram test . Dr. Butler testified that the test classified the 
dilation of the child's ventricles as " a moderate effect ." 60 
"Would it be a fair statement to say that at this very moment we 
really don 't know the full extent if any of brain damage? " Butler was 
asked. "Precisely, no," he responded . 61 
"All of these children," says MeLone, "have a brain malformation. 
The spina bifida child, virtually 100% of those children have the Chiari 
~be brai~ ~alfor~ation, whic~ is a ~rof~und brai': mal~ormation . 
owever, It Is a bram malformatiOn which Is compatible with normal ~velopm~nt function." MeLone said, "Virtually 98 percent of these 
ds at birth will have a dilated ventricular system and 15 to 20 
percent. of those kids will have a small head, and still it's perfectly 
compatible with normal intelligence." 62 · 
rec Pr_ess accounts have repeatedly stated that Baby Jane, if she 
~Ived the necessary surgery, was destined to be " bedridden. " Testi-
. g on Baby Jane's probable daily routine after the proposed sur-
r;{· Dr. Newman said, " It would likely consist of lying in bed, being 
e Probably by bottle. · . .. "63 Later in the hearing however New-
man• . . · ' ' fr 5 own wntten prognosis for the child was quoted by Dr. Butler 
001 t~e medical records: " The prognosis offered with appropriate 
reservation was for probable . .. walking with bracing .. .. "64 
MeLone agrees with the more optimistic of Newman 's duel prog-~OSes. "If you take our experience of a child with a head circumfer-
m~e of 31 ~entimeters with a sl~~htly dilate~ ventricular system, L-3 m~:r level .m the lower extremities [all ascnbed to Baby Jane in the 
have cal testim~ny] ! would predict that that child in our hands would 
a normal mtelhgence and would be a community ambulator ... 
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[walking] probably with some bracing. " Wheelchair confinem< t for 
such a child whose spina bifida condition was aggressively ·ated 
within the first hours after birth , says MeLone, would not e · n be 
anticipated. 65 
Media reports similarly appear to have distorted Baby J an! Joe's 
life expectancy. Although New York trial court Justice Melvyn men· 
baum in his oral opinion summarized the testimony as pred t ing a 
maximum lifespan of 20 years even with surgery, Newman · tes ti -
mony, upon which the reco llection was based, reads som ewhat :iffer-
ently . " How long might the child live after surgery?" l\'ewm 1 was 
asked. "There is really no way of plac ing a limit on it if the su ery ts 
performed, " he answered. 66 "Could it cont.:eivably be twenty · ·a rs'!" 
asked the cross examiner. "Yes," Newman answered , " ... 20 c'ar~ is 
possible.,. 6 7 f'\o physician ever claimed, however, that 20 yea were 
the outside limit of Baby Jane 's life expectancy. 
Media assertions that the child would be in constant pain a l of her 
life apparently derive from Newman's testimony that. as wit o ther 
chi ldren, "she is capable of experiencing pain. " 68 Speculatmg Jl1 thP 
possible infections, commonly contracted ·and overeume by tJeople 
with spina bifida, that Baby Jane might develop, Newman tl •n said 
that to perform the lifesaving surgery for t he child "would · tcrease 
the total pain that the child would experience." 69 
This is obvious in the sense that a longer life includes mo r,' of all 
life 's experiences, including pain. But the evidence is that • hildren 
with Baby Jane Doe's handicap do not experience significan t ly more 
pain than normal children. Contrary to editorial versions of th P child's 
story Dr. Butler in Newsday stated that for a child similarl y , it uated 
to Ba,by Jane, "certainly there would be little expectation of pain.·· ·o 
In another apparent contradiction, Dr. Newman claimed 1 hat the 
child's arms were spastic.71 Butler, however. agreed with t he state-
ment that the child's upper extremities had '·good reflexes in relatiOn 
to nervous system testing." 72 He testified that "the child ca n movt' 
[her arms] around, at least to the extent that would be expe <" ted of a 
nonaffected baby." 73 
Custodial care which involved failure to drain the excess fl u id in the 
child's head and to close the lesion , or meningomyelocel e. on th~ 
child's spine was described in the hearings as "conservative trea tment 
by the parents' lawyer, Paul 'Gianelli . 71 MeLone, however, cMbiders 
this care to leave the spina bifida condition •· untreated. ,. Writing 10 
the recent anthology Infanticide and the Handicapped N ewborn . 
MeLone said " If by 'untreated ' one m eans providing only suppor~tve 
care for the child in the form of proper nourishment and appropnate 
medications but withholding surgical therapy , then the mortali ty ratP 
[in the first two years of life is] 60-80 percent. " 75 The decis ion not 
to treat was made on the basis of the Lorber criteria, nam l:'d fora 
British neurosurgeon who, Newman said, promulgated "certain critena 
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which ... would predict a virtually invariable poor outcome" for cer-
tain infants with spina bifida. 76 But Dr . MeLone asserts, " I think that 
that criteria has been proven over and over in institutions. in this 
country to be completely invalid ." 77 
Did the decision to deny the corrective measures place Baby Jane 
. - "in eminent [sic ] danger, or in risk of eminent [sic ] danger?" "No," 
-Newman responded. 78 Questioning Butler, however, the judge noted, 
"You have said that there is an imminent danger of infection, with the 
onset of infection the child will be lost, is that a fair statement?" 
Butler answered, "That's correct." 79 Earlier Butler was asked , "Would 
the operation ... remove the danger of infection or the risk of infec-
tion?" "[S 1 ignificantly," Butler responded . 80 Dr . Keuscamp, the first 
neurosurgeon in charge of the infant 's care, recommended immediate 
transfer to Stony Brook Hospital , where the surgery could be per-
formed . The parents o riginally consented to transfer for the sur-
gery,81 but, under Dr . Newman's advice, changed t heir minds. Keus-
camp thereafter withdrew from the case "in light of his fee ling that 
the surgery should be performed. " 82 
Did the requested corrective procedures constitute ordinary medical 
care for a child in Baby Jane's condition? Yes, answered Dr. Butler, 
again con tradicting Newman. "In the sense that what we do most com-
monly or how we most commonly treat an infant who presents with 
these groups of problems ... . In that sense, in most instances the 
surgical procedure is performed to repair the myelomeningocele and 
then either at the same operation or shortly thereafter to perform the 
shunting procedure ."8a The Newsday interview with Butler, more-
over, described him as one who " favors surgery in cases medically 
identical to those of Baby Jane because he believes such infants have 
far more potential than other Stony Brook physicians have predicted 
for the patient." 84 · 
The picture which emerges of Baby Jane Doe is that, far from being 
a "hard case ," she is really one of the better cases in terms of prog-
nosis for a high " quality of life." Her saga illustrates the profound 
unreason that an openness to discrimination fosters: a willingness, 
even an eagerness, to believe the worst about a minority in order 
consciously or subconsciously to justify a denial of equal protection. 
History has taught over and over again how this willingness systemat-
Ically leads to distortion in the view the majority holds of the minor-
ity, the acceptance of in~cc uracies and stereotypes which in turn, 
reinforce the discriminatory attitude. This cycle, in which discrim-
in_ation and failure of perception reinforce and feed each other, step 
by step leads to an ever expanding class of victims and a gradually 
increasing degree of gravity of the wrongs the majority is led to perpe-
trate upon t he minority. This ignoble tradition is carried out fully in 
the Baby Jane Doe case . For in the space of five months, different 
levels of the courts progressed from opinions which simply got the 
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facts wrong while asserting the right and duty of society to inte; ene 
to save the lives of the disabled, through opinions virulent in 1eir 
denunciation of any who sought to intervene, to an opinion hat 
disclaimed any authority to intervene at all. An understanding of tese 
opinions, however, requires that we first examine Section 504 ar the 
"Baby Doe Rule.'' 
The Baby Doe Rule and the President's Commission Report 
The well-publicized April, 1982 denial of food and surgE 1 to 
Bloomington, Indiana's " Infant Doe" prompted President Reaf: to 
issue a statement on April 30, 1982, in which he directed HI- to 
notify health care providers of the applicability of Section 504 " the 
Rehabilitation Act of 197 3 to discriminatory denial of food or 1edi-
cal treatment to disabled infants. 85 On May 18, 1982, HHS · sued 
such a notice to the country's 7,000 hospitals, an act denounc d by 
hospital and medical associations. 86 
It was not until March 7, 1983, however, that HHS issued ~ gula-
tions dealing with the problem . . '!7 This first version of thr rules 
required posting of a notice in each hospital ward likely tc treat 
disabled newborns. The notice stated that " Discriminatory Fail· re to 
Feed and Care for Handicapped Infants in This Facility is Prob, ited 
by Federal Law." It gave 800-368-1019 as the number of a to!l free 
24-hour hotline through which confidentially to report susr ected 
denial of "food or customary medical treatment" to the HHS ffice 
of Civil Rights (OCR). The regulations also allowed federal investiga-
tors to visit the hospital at any time, not just during "normal business 
hours," and to act to enforce compliance without the 10-day waiting 
period required in other civil rights investigations. 
Also in March, 1983, the President's Commission for the Study of 
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavior Research 
released its report, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment, 
with a chapter on "Seriously Ill Newborns."88 
The President's Commission divided the problem into three 
categories: 
1) where treatment is available which would clearly benefit the 
child; 
2) where all treatment is futile; 
3) where the probable benefits to an infant from different choices 
are quite uncertain. . 
Concluding that in c1ll cases th~ standard or norm for treatmen~ ts 
the best interests of the child as seen from the child's own perspecttve 
(not that of the parents), the Commission concluded that as to cate-
gory one, a very strict standard is appropriate : " Such permanent han· 
dicaps justify a decision not to provide life sustaining treatment onlY 
when they are so severe that continued existence would not be a net 
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benefit to the infant .... [The standard] excludes consideration of 
the negative effects of an iPlpaired child's life on other persons, 
including parents, siblings, and society.'' 89 · 
As to category two, where all treatment is clearly futile, omission of 
. "treatment" is clearly legally and ethically justifiable. 
A physician is not mandated by Jaw to render useless treatment. By 
"useless' is meant that continuation of the therapy cannot and does 
not improve the prognosis for recovery. Even if the therapy is neces-
sary to maintain stability, such therapy should not be mandatory 
where ti:)e ultimate prognosis is hopeless. This does not mean that 
ordinary means of life-support , such as food and drink, can be discon-
tinued merely because the ultimate prognosis is hopeless. It does 
mean, however, that physicians can exercise sound medical judgment 
and common sense in determining whether treatment is efficacious 
and, if it is not, then to cease the treatment. When the patient's illness 
is terminal and the end is near, society, through the physician, should 
be concerned with easing the difficult burden of death with loving 
care and concern. This goal is not achieved through officious death-
bed burdens such as sustained heroic treatment, flawed living wills, or 
mandatory court approval for decisions that are best guided by medi-
cal judgment. 
The physician who withdraws treatment from the terminally ill 
patient whose death is imminent should not be held criminally or 
civilly liable for such conduct when this care unduly prolongs life of 
the dying patient without holding out any ~:easonable hope of benefit. 
The withdrawal of treatment that only briefly forestalls imminent and 
inevitable death does not legally cause the death of the patient, since 
such conduct merely allows the underlying disease or illness to run its 
inevitable course. 
We speak here of a limited class of cases, however. When referring 
to "treatment," we mean a regimen of medical care, as distinguished 
from ordinary care such as food and drink. Nourishment and palliative 
care should be given to all patients, even to those terminally-ill and 
from whom treatment has been withdrawn. When referring to "use-
less" treatment or "hopeless" cases, we mean those situations in which 
the decision to withdraw treatment is in essence a recognition that 
nothing more can be ·done for the patient, that the only sensible 
course is to withdraw treat.ment. The physician cannot be held liable 
for death here because he has not caused the patient to die. Rather, he 
simply has recognized, in exercise of sound medical judgment, that 
d~ath from this disease or condition is inevitable and imminent. 
As to the third category -ambiguous cases-the Commission prop-
erly acknowledges that the difficulty in these cases arises from factual 
uncertainties. It looks to the creation of objective medical standards 
learned after the new medical area of neonatology has had the oppor-
tunity to grapple with such difficult issues: It also proposes procedural 
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recommendations ,uch as Infant Care Committees so that deci ms 
t·orwerning the treatment o f severely handi capped newborns are . tde 
aftP r ,·u nsult a tion. with prospects for retrospective review. ~o It the 
,·ontt·x t o f this, it c riticizes t he " Baby Doe" regulations as u ·ar-
raniPdl y " adwrsarial. · ·~ r 
HowPw r. 1 htJ important observation here is that the Commis~ n h 
o f t ht> upin1un that most cases involving treatment ch01ces f(l the 
severely handit·ap!Jed ne wborn will fall in category one. Th is so 
si nce . the Com mission says, the !Ja rents may not "rt'jf'L't t n ·a 1 Pill 
that is relraiJiy ex !Je<'t f'd lo benefit a sPriously ill 1wwborn ::.u ~ tan-
tiall y as"' u .~ua/1 .\ / r ue t/ lt/e mn he .~al'ed" tPm as!S 
acJdPd) . ":1 Down ' ::. syndrumt' r:. "1-l'~ c· rf J('a lly t•:-., ·ludPd IJy thP Co • m b · 
~ ron as gro unds for refu srn g treatmPnt. \ t.l 
:Yi eanwhile . the first " Rahy U op" nJgulaticn wa:- t·hallt>nged 1 Dis· 
trll'l of Co lumbia fedPral distrit'l t·o urt by thP Amerit·an ,-\('ad ~· · of 
l' t•dia tri('s and other medical groups . On April 1-L l~H;·L judg· GPr· 
hard Gt>sell Pnjoined the rules . L·a llmg them "arbitrary and caprit )us·· 
and rulmg that there was insuffic ient Pvidenc_e of an emt>rgenc ade-
4Uate to waive the fiU -day co mm Pnl period norm all y requirPd l .- tht> 
.\dmini strative Procedure .\!'1 lwfon' proposPd federal regulatio , can 
tak ~> l'ffect. " 1 
In n'sponse . o n .July 5. 1983. HHS puhiishPd as a proposal a - l'ond 
versio n of the regulatio n,."" They rt>ducecJ the size of the no ce to 
8 '12' ' x 11" (from 8' '~ .. x 1-l" In the ongmal rules ). and required · nat it 
be posted only 111 nurses · stations. nut wards. (A principal cr it il' ~ m of 
the original regulation had been that janitors, vi:.itors, or other medi-
cally untrained persons might hP induct>d by a public notice u, make 
frivol o us and harassi ng complaints. ) They added a set of requi rements 
for sta tt' l·hild protection agf'n('ies rP< ·eiving ft>dP ral fin ancial as~ is· 
tance: the agenc ies would have to devPlop written pruced urPs for 
dealing with treatm ent denial rt>por ts on a ti mely basis , including, 
··where appropriate.'' on - si te investigation, and make prov is1o n for 
see king timPly court order.-; "to l'ompel the provision of nPcessarY 
nounshmt•nt and medica l trPatment . •· ~" · They rPquired state agencies 
to notify the Office for Civi l Rights of eac h report received an d o f the 
~te ps taken to investiga te and dispose of t he report. ThPy also added an 
a!Jpendix describing, with exampl es , the di stinction bet wee n an 
acceptable decisiOn not to at tem pt futil e t reatment and an unac.cep· 
table decision "for those handi capped infants ... who could live if 
given treatm ent fo r a life-threatening co ngenital anomaly . .. to with· 
hold trl'at ment which is based o n the infant 's handicap rather than on 
a mt'dil·al judgment . . . _" H' 
During thl' 60 -day l'O mm Pnt period , 97 .5r;, o f the 16,331 co mments 
rel'e ived ~uppo rt f'd 't he proposed regulation . ~R However, hospital and 
physic ian groups v<•hemPntly denounc ed them and the American 
.\ cademy of Pediatrics proposed a detai led alternati ve whi ch would 
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provide for no applicability of Section 504 but, based on Medicaid 
and Medicare regulatory authority, would require each hospital (or 
groups of nearby hospitals) to create an " Infant Bioethical Review 
Board." Such boards would be vested with authority to decide con-
tested cases of denial of food or treatment. The American Medical 
· ·Association, however, opposed the notion of any government inter-
. vention, including government mandated hospital review boards. 99 
In November, 1983, according to Felicity Barringer of the Washing-
ton Post, "Surgeon General C. Everett Koop, on a trip with Health 
and Human Services Secretary Margaret M. Heckler, told her that it 
would be easier to take the heat for the controversial rule if he had 
some part in writing it. ' It's all yours,' Heckler responded, according 
to someone familiar with the conversation."Ioo Koop then sponsored 
negotiations which included medical organizations and disability rights 
organizations. 
The compromise result of those negotiations was publicly 
announced on Jan. 9 as the third and final set of regulations. 101 
The final rule is far more elaborate than its predecessors. The 
requirement that notice be posted is retained, although its size is 
~educed to 5" x 7" and it now need not be posted either in wards or 
m nurses' stations; it may be posted someplace "where nurses and 
other medical professionals can see it," such as a cafeteria or locker 
roo~, yet which is not " in area(s ) where parents of infant patients will 
~e It." 102 However, there are two alternative notices, both changed 
m wording from that used in the previously published version of t he 
regulations. Each is now headed " Principles of Treatment of Disabled 
Infants." "Notice B" states "Federal law prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of handicap. Under this law, nourishment and medically 
ben f"al e 1c1 treatment (as determined with respect for reasonable medi-
cal judgments) ·should not be withheld from handicapped infants 
~lel~ on the basis of their present or anticipated mental or physical 
~P81rment." It lists the telephone numbers of the state child protec-
tive · semce and of the HHS OCR toll-free 24-hour number , pledges 
that the identity of callers will be kept confidential and notes that 
retaliation against callers is prohibited. 103 ' 
"~otice A" is similar, but it begins, "It is the policy of t his hospit al, 
consiStent with federal law" and then states the same standard of care. 
Above the number of the st~te and federal agencies, it lists the number 
of a "hospital contact point ," either " for further information, or to 
~port suspected noncompliance." 104 Hospitals may use "Notice B" 
~/hey 1) officially adopt the standard of care described in the notice, 
agree to maintain confidentiality of those who make reports and 
~ot to retaliate against them (although a " hospital need not .. . forego 
h an~ement prerogatives with respect to anyone who might abuse the 
~SPital's procedures by, for example, willfully making false or mali-
CIOUs calls," and 3) implement "a procedure for review of treat-
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ment deliberations and decisions to which the notice applies, sw as 
(but not limited to) an Infant Care Review Committee."105 
A model committee is outlined in the regulations, follo ing 
basically the format ·proposed by the American Academy of Pe iat-
rics, but everything suggested about the committee by the regula· ons 
is purely advisory. Its composition and procedures - and ven 
whether there is to be a committee at all, so long as there is ,me 
procedure for review of treatment deliberations- are left entire 1 to 
the discretion of each hospital. 106 
Appended to the final rule is a set of guidelines for HHS inve ~ iga­
tions . "Unless impracticable," if a hospital has an Infant Care R• view 
Committee, federal investigators will wait 24 hours after recei' -t of 
any report of denial of treatment to allow that committee to co1 ider 
the case and make its analysis and recommendations. An HHS m• -i ical 
consultant will contact the Committee. After receiving the Cor· mit-
tee's report, and with input from the medical consultant, the ir. ·esti-
gators will determine whether an on-site visit is necessary. The s1: ple-
mentary information published with the recommendation emph tsizes 
that the Office of Civil Rights "undertakes a careful screen i•1g of 
complaints in an effort to avoid unnecessary on-site inv• stiga· 
tions." 107 Should such an investigation be authorized, the first step 
of the investigators will be to meet with the Infant Care Review 
Committee. 
Before promulgation of the final rule, disability rights groups had 
emphasized the importance of securing a physical examination of the 
child by the medical consultant. For example, in its comment letter, 
the Spina Bifida Association of America had emphasized, "The key to 
effective enforcement is securing an independent medical exam ination 
of children allegedly being denied treatment, by a physician or medi-
cal team both skilled in modem treatment techniques and com mitted 
to the equal treatment principle .... The only way to ensure effective 
enforcement is to give disability rights groups like SBAA the ability to 
recommend which expertise centers and expert consultants are used 
by the regional OCR offices to conduct the independent medical 
examinations." 108 The Department firmly rebuffed this con cept of 
the role of the medical consultant. "It is important that all interested 
groups understand the precise · and limited role of the OCR medical 
consultants. Their function is not ... to conduct a personal , indepen-
dent examination of the infant . . .. " 109 Instead, the Department said, 
it is only to examine the medical records, in some cases discuss the 
matter with the attending physician, and then give investigators "an 
opinion as to whether medically beneficial treatment was provided ." 110 
The standard of care to be enfqrced is set forth in "Interpretative 
guidelines relating 'to the applicability of this part to health care for 
handicapped infants: ... . [H) ealth care providers may not, solely on 
the basis of present or anticipated physical or mental impairments of 
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an infant, withhold treatment or nourishment from the infant who, in 
spite of such impairments, will medically benefit from the treatment 
or nourishment." 111 The guidelines emphasize that "treatment that 
will do no more than temporarily prolong the act of dying of a ter-
minally ill infant is not considered treatment that will medically bene-
. fit the infant," 112 and that " [ i] n determining whether certain pos-
sible treatments will be medically beneficial to an infant, reasonable 
medical judgments in selecting among alternative courses of treatment 
will be respected." na 
Much of the effectiveness of Section 504's enforcement will, of 
course, depend on how "medically beneficial treatment" is construed, 
and on precisely how wide a variance is tolerated as "reasonable medi-
cal judgment. " The supplementary information keyed to these guide-
lines places considerable emphasis on the " principle of respecting 
reasonable medical judgments;" the Department will not "seek to 
engage in second-guessing of reasonable medical judgments regarding 
medically beneficial care." 114 However, it is stated that " the Depart-
ment also recognizes that not every opinion expressed by a doctor 
automatically qualifies as a reasonable medical judgment," and gives 
the example of " a doctor's opinion that available corrective surgery to 
save the life of a Down's syndrome infant should be withheld." 115 The 
section of the supplementary information purporting to d eal with 
"Medically Beneficial Treatment" does not explain that term ; 116 
however, another section is quite helpful and positive. 
[I] f . . . surge ry would be m edically beneficial , in that it would be likely , 
in the exercise of reasonable m edical judgmen t , to bri ng about its intende d 
result of avoiding . . : fata l consequences, t hen failure to per form t h e su r-
gery because of t he a n ticipated impairments in future life offends section 
504, as the withholding of su rge ry is because of t h e handicap and in spite of 
the infant 's being qualified to rece.ive the su rgery . 11 7 
. There is one significant and troubling omission from the interpreta-
ti~e guidelines. The corresponding appendix in the proposed rules con-
tained a paragraph which read : 
[T J he · basic provision o f nourishment, fl u ids, and routine nursi ng care is a 
fundamental m atter o f human dignity , not an option for m edical judgm ent. 
Even if a handicapped infant faced imminent and unavoidable death , no 
. health care provide r should take upon itself to cau se dea t h by starvation or 
dehydration . Routine nursing care to provi de comfort and cleanliness is 
required to respect t he dignity of such a n infant. To deny these forms of 
basic care to ha ndicapped indi vidua ls would constitute discri minat ion con-
trary to section 5 04 . 118 
.No trace of such a view appears in t he final regulations. The supple-
mentary information notes that " The American Society for Parenteral 
~d- Enteral Nutrition stated that although there are no circumstances 
~Ustlfying 'withholding oral feeding through a working digestive tract 
lll any patient capable of digesting food , in whole or in part,' there 
may be 'limited circumstances ' in which not providing nourishment 
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through intravPnous mf'ans ·may be appropriatf' . ' ·· 11 9 Wit!" ut 
directly re plying to that <·omment, the Department's " Rf'spo 1 p '' 
states, " The imprudent:f' uf seeking to speculatE' on the out ~:om of 
applying Section 50 I in a widf' variety of spPcific factual l"in m· 
stances was underscon>d by somP of the <'ommPnts rf'cf'ived ... and n~s 
on to say that. in balancing "the utility of providing som<· exam)J l• to 
assist in und!:'rstand i ng the analytical framPwork of t ht• stat ut p .. nd 
··thf' nt> ~·d to allow individual attt•ntion to spel·Ific fa1 ·tual ci n m-
~tann•s ... It wa,.; decided I o list only "f'xamples dt>aling with I>o n\ 
syndrome. spma bifida. an<·ncephaly. and PxtrPmt• pr!'maturity . ~ ~~~ 
Tht> unfortunatt · Im)Jlication is that, in contrast with its ~>m p l .t i1 · 
assE·rt ion of a un ivt>r..,al duty to provide n utn tion en unl"!at t>d 1r 1 hP 
proposed rult>!--. I II IS now regards at least some den ial of 111t rave ,w, 
fet>d1ng to bt> within th!' gray arPa to bf' decid<>d casP by · ·a s t' . 
L"niiPd Sta/P.~ ol .- \ rnerica t" . UniL'ersi/y Hospitul 
The .. Baby Dllt'.. regulatIons art> based on Section 50-t o t thP 
Rehabilitation ..\t't o f 1~-;' : 1 1:! 1 Section 50-l rf'ads : 
:\o o l her w h <" q ud lt i" t< ·d llai id t, ·;, pJwd tndl\ tuual tn tlw L"n ttl-'d St a t• · ~ 
' ha ll . ,OJt · l~ · IJ~ · i' t"<IMIIl oJ' ht' ha ndtt ·a p. lw <'X <"iUU t'U J' rom pa r ttcipa tion in H' 
d•·n t< ·d t ht ·. bl' tH ·It h ul o r IJ•· ,uiJI< ·t·t• ·d tu di ,;cr iminat ion undt•r any j.ll'o g1 .m 
n·e~' l\ 111 g •· ,· dt·.-al l 1nanc 1c-t l .t .... :-. i ... t rt iH ' t • 
The government has a responsi bility under Section 504 to in esti-
gate all claims of disnimmation on act·ount of handicap in fed rally 
assistPd pro~;rams . Congress has similarly charged the exPcutive b ranch 
In t·ompanion •·ivil rights laws to pursue complaints of di scrimin il. to ry 
<·undLH·t based on race, sex. or national origin in programs rec i· J\'IIlg 
ft>dPral funding _ · 
SPction 50~ was enat·ted by Congress to ensure that renpie n ts of 
federal finan l' ial assistance . including providers of ·'hf'alth sen Jet's' ' 
opf•rat!:' their federally assisted program s without discrim inat ion 
agamst handi<'apped individuals. ! 2 2 HPalth t·are servi!"PS must bP J.m >-
vidPd to handicapped patient s ··on a basis of equality with th osP not 
handieappt>d ." 12 :l Handicapped patif'nts, thereforE>, mus t be given 
"' full and unquPstioned access to th e same type and durat io n of 
mpat1e nt ln•atmt>nt .. as is provided nonhandicapped )Jati en ts. 1 2 ~ 
Thus. JU st as Title VI provides that patients in federally assist ed hPalth 
1·arP )Jrugrams cannot bP treated difff' rently on the hasis of the ir rar e. 
t·olor. or national origin . Section 504 provides similar pro tect ion 
again st disc rimination on the basis of handi cap. 
Sec t ion 50 I is, in Pssl:'n<'e , an equal treatment, nondi scrim ination 
..; tandard . Programs or ac tivities receiving fPderal financial assis tance 
may not dPny a bP'nt>fit, servicE' or treatment solely on grounds of a 
)Jerson 's handil"ap just as th ey may not d eny a benefit or service on 
~rounds or a person 's rat ·e_ 
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At the time of the New York State court rules on the Baby Jane 
Due case, there was no versiop of the "Baby Doe" regulations then in 
force. The first set was under injunction, the comment period on thP. 
second (proposed) version had only recently ended, and the third, 
final version was yet to be issued. Thus, when the HHS Office for Civil 
Rights sought Baby Jane's records from University Hospital (S .U.N.Y. 
Stony Brook), it did so, not under the authority of the " Baby Doe" 
regulations, but under that of the statutory provision itself, and of 
pre-existing regulations which require federal financial assistance recip-
ients to ~'permit access . _ . to such of its books, records , accounts, and 
other sources of information ... as may be pertinent to ascertain 
compliance .... "12 5 
When the hospital refused to turn over the requested records , the 
Justice Department instituted suit . On Nov. 17, 1983, District Judge 
Leonard Wexler granted the hospital 's motion for summary judgment, 
denying the federal government access to the records. 1·2s Like the 
New York intermediate appellate court, the federal district court ren" 
dered a fairly narrow, fact-based ruling. Judge Wexler rejected the 
hospital's reliance on the doctor-patient evidentiary privilege and on 
the constitutional right of privacy_I2 7 He characterized the latter 
argument as " extremely weak ." 
In the instant ac tion, plaintiff is , a t least implicit ly , all eging the poss ibi li ty 
that the parents of Baby J a ne Doe, in re fu si ng t h ei r consen t to su rg ica l 
procedures, were not acting in t h e bes t interests of the child. It would be 
highly paradoxica l if a n indi vidu a l 's r ight t o privac y could be asserted by 
.that individual 's pare nt or gu ardian , pu rportedl y ac t ing in that individual's 
own best inte rests, for the purpose of precluding an inquiry into the ques" 
tion of wheth e r th e parent or guardian was in fac t acting in the individual 's 
best interests .. . . Unde r differe nt facts, . . . it is quite possible that an asser-
tion by a paren ~ o n be ha lf of a handicapped child of t h e child 's righ t to 
privacy made to pre clude the release o f the child 's m edical records t o offi-
cials would not be s ustain ed as a valid invocation of th e constitutional righ t 
to privacy . 
· . . [T J he Cou rt nee d not discuss t h e ex t en t to wh ich t h e stat u te author-
izes chalenges [sic J by the fe de ral gove rnm ent t o un reaso nable choices o f 
medical treatment for handicappe d children. We may note , however , t hat it 
IS qui te possibl e t ha t t he sta t ute does a ut horize such chall enges. If so , this 
would appea r to be a constitu t ional e xerc ise o f fe d e ral le gi slat ive power, 
· given th e fede ral inte res t in preventing discrimination against the ha ndi" 
capped in hospitals rece iving fede ral financial assistance . _ . 128 
However, Judge Wexler . held that, since the regulation at issue 
all_owed federal access to institutional records only " to ascertain com-
Pliance," if the institution was "clearly not violating" Section 504, the 
government could not obtain access. 129 This was the situation in the 
Baby Jane Doe case, he held, for two reasons: first, because the hospi-
tal was denying surgery, not on the basis of the child 's handicap, but 
because the parents had refused consent and it had no legal right to 
Pt'Ovide the surgery without that consent ; second, because " the papers 
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submitted to the Court demonstrate conclusively that the decisi• 1 of 
the parents to refuse consent to the surgical procedures was a re :;on-
able one based on due consideration of the medical options ava -:~ble 
and on a genuine concern for the best interests of the child." 130 
Judge Wexler's decision was unfortunate, not only because, a this 
article has earlier demonstrated, 131 he misapprehended the acts 
about Baby Jane Doe's medical condition and prospects, bul also 
because he seemed to hold that a medical institution could s.l ~ lter 
itself behind a parental refusal to consent to treatment as an abc lute 
bar to enforcement of the anti-discrimination statute. It is true ' 1at a 
physician or medical institution cannot ordinarily perform surg· y or 
provide other treatment to a minor when the minor's parents or ~ tard-
ian refuse to consent. However, that refusal does not vitiate the ospi-
tal and the physician's obligation to render clearly necessary ~spe· 
cially life saving) treatment to its patient: the child. Medical pers nnel 
have the ability to seek a court order (or, as in the case of New ,'ork, 
at least the involvement of the state Child Abuse and Neglect Ag· ncy) 
to overcome the refusal to consent in order to protect the life c.• f the 
child. Indeed, such governmental intervention is routinely s ,ught 
when parental religious objections prevent lifesaving treatment . r f it is 
the practice of a physician or hospital to employ these mechani.., rns to 
secure treatment for a nonhandicapped child whose parents refuse 
consent to treatment, then failure to do so when a child is handi-
capped, solely because of the handicap, is prohibited discrim im t ion. 
The Justice Department appealed from Judge Wexler's decisiOn to 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. On Feb. 23, 1984, a panel of 
that court affirmed the district court's decision by a 2-1 majority , but 
on far more troubling grounds than those employed by the lower 
court. 
The Court of Appeals rejected the view "that the government was 
required to establish some evidence of unlawful discrimination as a 
condition to obtaining the requested records." 132 Instead, it concen-
trated on whether denial of lifesaving treatment to a disabled newborn 
could be regarded as "unlawful discrimination" at all under Section 
504. 
The court's answer was no. It said that Congress had never discussed 
or anticipated the application of Section 504 to medical t reatment 
decisions concerning disabled newborns while enacting the provision-
It said that Congress, in other contexts, had expressed a disinclination 
to regulate health care decisions. It expressed skepticism that a dis· 
abled infant could be seen as "otherwise qualified" for medical treat· 
ment: 
66 
As the mainstrel!m of cases under Section 504 exemplifies, the phrase 
"otherwise qualified" is geared toward relatively static programs o r ac tivities 
such as education, . .. employment, . . . and transportation systems . . . . As 
a result, the phrase cannot be applied in the comparatively fluid con text of 
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medical treatment decisions without distorting its plain meaning. In com-
mon parlance, one would not ordinarily think of a newborn infant suffering 
from multiple birth defects as being " otherwise qualified " to have corrective 
surgery performed or to have a hospital initiate litigation seeking to override 
a decision against surgery by the infant's parents . 133 
The court relied heavily on the "complexity" of medical decisions. 
"[T] he government has taken an oversimplified view of the medical 
decisionmaking process. Where the handicapped condition is related to 
the condition(s) to be treated, it will rarely, if ever, be possible to say 
with certl!-inty that a particular decision was 'discriminatory.' "13 4 
These concerns are groundless. A conclusive response appears in the 
"Supplemental Information P accompanying the final "Baby Doe" rule: 
[W] here the handicapping condition and the condition to be treated are the 
same . . · . the "handicap" is the physical or mental impairment the infant has 
or will have (or "is regarded as having" ) after complet ion of the treatment 
under consideration. In the case of an infant born with myelomeningocele, 
for example, the treatment which must be considered is surgery to close the 
protruding sac to prevent infection and other potentially fatal conse -
quences. The "handicap" is the physical and /or mental impairment the 
infant is regarded as likely to have in future life. To the extent the myelo -
meningocele itself or other complications . . . present, in the exercise of 
reasonable medical judgment, contraindications to the surgery , the infan t is 
not able to benefit, in spite of his o r her handicap, from the surgery. 
However, if the surgery would be . .. likely , in the exercise of reasonable 
medical judgment, to bring about its intended result of avoiding infection or 
other fatal consequences, then failure to perform the surgery because of the 
anticipated impairments in future life offends section 504 , as the with-
holding of surgery is because of the handicap and in spite of the infan t's 
being qualified to receive the surgery . 135 
As the dissent pointed out, the majority evaded the clear intent of 
~ongress to analogize discrimination against the disabled to discrimina-
tion on the basis of race. 
A judgment not to perform certain surgery because a person is black is not a 
bona fide medical judgment. So too, a decision not to correct a life .threat-
ening digestive problem because an infant has Down 's Syndrome is not a 
bona fide medical judgment. The issue of parental authority is also quickly 
disposed of. A denial of medical treatment to an infant because the infant is 
black is not legitimated by parental consent .. .. 
The logic of the government 's position on these aspects of the case is 
thus about as flawless as a legal argument can be. 136 
. As we write, a Justice Department motion for a rehearing en bane 
18 l>ending before the full Second Circuit. Whatever happens to that 
lllotion, eventual recourse to the Supreme Court is likely. 
The Constitutional Issue Is Ripe 
ti ~tever may be the ultimate outcome of the statutory construc-
thon ISsue rai~ed i? United States of America v. Univ~r~ity_Hospital of 
e State Unwerslty of New York at Stony· Brook, 1t 1s vrrtually cer-
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tain that sooner or later the constitutional issues raised by de · 1! of 
treatment cases will have to be faced , ultimately by the SL ·erne 
Court. As we write, there is legislation pending in Congres (one 
version has been passed by the House of Representatives, vhile 
another has been reported out of committee in the Senate ) hich 
would specifically address the nontreatment issue in terms tha· auld 
leave no judicial doubt about Congressional intent to face it squaJ y.l 37 
Should a law that passes regulate the area in some fo rn it is 
virtually certain that the American Medical Association or som · Jther 
group of medical professionals will challenge it, relying on a f m of 
the familial privacy doctrine. It is almost as certain that som( lay a 
child with a disability will be denied treatment in a state hospit : or in 
some other circumstances constituting state action and someor with 
standing to raise the child's rights will contend that the Constit t ion is 
being violated by that denial. 
In either case, the resulting litigation will undoubtedly see clash 
of the contending constitutional theories : the parents' assert~:· right 
to privacy versus the child's asserted right to life and equal pro .~ ction 
of the law. The Court will decide no more crucial case in our nera-
tion. It will test whether we, as a nation, still maintain, as Justi• ,, John 
Marshall Harlan wrote, that "In view of the Constitution, in thE eye of 
the law, there is in this country no superior ... class of citizen ~ . . .. In 
respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the !a ·.v . The 
humblest is the peer of the most powerful." 138 
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APPENDIX 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR 
THE COUNTY OF MONROE 
STATE OF INDIANA 
IN THE MATTER OF THE TREATMENT AND CARE OF INFANT DOE 
CAUSE NO. GU 8204-004A 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
Th is m atter cam e to be heard by t he Court under certain ex traordinary condi· 
Linacre QuarterlY 
tions conce rning the e m erge ncy care and treatm en t of a minor c hild born at t he 
Bloomington Hos pital. 
The Court was contacted at h is residence by representatives of the .Bloom ing-
ton Hospital. On the basis of representat ions m ade by th ose represe n tatives, the 
Court quickl y determ ined th at an extreme em ergency existed. 
The Court further determine d that t he Judge of the Monroe Circuit Court had 
been contacted concernin g t hi s m atter and was unable to attend the e m erge ncy 
hearing, and the Co urt p ersonally contacted t he J udge of the Monroe Circ u it 
Court who directed t h is Court to p roceed with .hearing. Thereafter , hearing was 
held on the S ixth Floor of the Bloomington Hospital at approximately 10 :3 0 
p.m., Sa turday, the lOth day of Apri l, 1982. 
The fQilowing persons were present : John Do e, natural father of In fant Doe, 
with counsel, Andrew C. Mallor, Esquire; Maggie Ke ller, Gene Perry, Ad m inistra-
tive Vice-Presid ents of Bloom ington Hospital ; Len E. Bunger, counsel for Bloom-
ington Hospi tal ; Dr. Walter L . Owens , Dr. William R. Anderson , Dr. Brandt L. 
Ludlow, obstetricians adm itted to practice in the State of Indiana with privileges 
at Bloomington Hospital, Doctor Owe ns bei ng the o bstetrician in atten dance at 
delivery o f Infan t Doe; D r. Paul J. Wenzler , family practitioner with pediatric 
privilege at Bloomingto n Hospital and who has atte nded to Mr . and Mrs. Doe's 
other two children after t heir birth ; Dr. Jam es J . Schaffer and Dr . Jam es J . 
Laughlin ,' pediatric ia ns ho ld ing ped iatric privileges at Bloomington Hospital. (Mrs. 
Doe was physicall y unable to attend. ) 
The Court thereafter heard evid ence. Do"tor Owens spoke for and on behalf of 
the obste tric group that delivered the Infant Doe , advising the Court that at approxi-
mately 8: 19 p .m . on t he eveni ng of Apri l 9, In fant Doe was born to Mary Doe in 
an unevent ful de livery, bu t that shortly thereafter it was very apparent that the 
child suffere d from Down 's Syndrome, with the further complication of tracheo-
esophageal fistul a, m ea nin g t he passage from the mouth to the stomach had not 
appropriately develope d a nd , in fact , were the ch ild to be fed orally, su bstances 
would be ta ken into t he lungs and the ch ild most likely would suffocate. 
. Doctor Owens furth er stated that he ha d been previously advised that Doctor 
Wenzler would serve as practit io ner for Infant Doe and that he was furt h er advised 
th_at Doctor Wenzler, w he n face d w ith extraordinary cases , routinely consulted 
~lth Doct or Schaffer. Doctor Schaffer was at the Bloom ington Hospital at that 
bme and was call ed b y Doctor O wens and was requested to exam ine t he bahy. 
Doctor Wenzler was n otifie d. Doctors Owens, Schaffer and Wenzler co nsulted; 
Doctors Wenzler and Scha ffer indi cated that the p roper treatm ent for In fa n t Doe 
was his immediate transfer to R iley Hospital for corrective su rgery. Doctor ~Wens , representi ng t he concurring opinions of h imself , Drs. Anderson and 
k Udlow, recommended that t he ch il d remam at Bloom mgton Hosp1tal w tth full 
B nowledge tha t surgery to c o rrect tracheoesophageal fistula was not possibl e at loom~ngton Hospital a nd t hat with in a short period of ti m e the ch ild would 
succ~mb due to inabili ty to receive nu trients and /or p n eumonia. 
te His reco mmended cou rse of treatment consisted of basic techniq ues adm inis-
t re_d _ to a id in keeping the ch ild comfortable and free of pain. Doctor Owens 
a~~lfled that ,_ even if su rgery werP. successful, the pos~ibility of a. minim~lly 
quate quah ty of life was non-existe nt due to the childs severe and 1rrevers1ble 
mental retardati on. 
.Docto r Schaffer test ified t hat Doctor Owens's prognosis regarding th e ch ild 's 
mental retarda ti on was correct but that he believed t he o nl y acceptabl e course of 
~edical treatm en t was transf~r to R iley Hospital in Indianapolis for repair of 
racheoesophageal fistul a. 
La Doc_to r Wenzler concurre d in Doctor Schaffer's proposed treatm en t. Doctor 
W Ughhn testi fi e d t hat he concu rred in t he opinions of Doctors Schaffer and 
enzler, and he differed wi t h Doctor Owens 's opinion in t hat he knew of at least 
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